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Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Now He Tells US !







Myron Scholes winner of the Nobel Prize in economics was one of the founding partners of Long Term Capital, the hedge fund that almost took down the world's financial system in 1998 due to the massive leverage of their fund. Ten + years later he was one of the participants in a Wall Street Journal sponsored forum on the Future Of Finance. Scholes was one of the main members of the working group on the future of credit markets. One of the five recommendations:

So the third point was about leverage.

MR. SCHOLES: Yes, the idea that the amount of leverage should be reduced or the amount of capital increased to match the risk of the enterprise, and the amount of capital required for the same level of risk be increased.

We believe that having more capital underlie the actual activities of the banks and other financial institutions is not that expensive


Roger Lowenstein's When Genius Failed, a classic of financial writing presents a great history of LTCM's demise.

Monday, March 16, 2009

Morningstar Strikes Again







The Morningstar advisor website features a comprehensive analysis of the failure of active managers to outperform their respective indices despite the bear market conditions when active managers were supposed to shine:

Bearly' Winning


by Daniel Culloton | 03-03-09


This is the big one; a bear market so fierce and unrelenting that it'll expose index funds for the dumb investments they are and allow active managers to show their quality.

Or maybe not.

I recently looked at how actively managed funds have fared versus similarly styled benchmarks thus far in this the worst stock market crash since the Great Depression. What I saw probably won't end up in any actively managed fund's marketing materials. While the typical active manager has beaten certain benchmarks from when the major market averages peaked on Oct. 9, 2007, through the end of January 2009, the victory hasn't been clear-cut. Also the typical stock-picker's inability to beat the Standard & Poor's style benchmarks in most categories undercuts the argument that active managers would hold up better in a severe downturn by favoring so-called higher-quality stocks.
....

Advantage, Market
There have been individual managers, management teams, and strategies that have limited the damage during this bear market. As the bear market drags on, active managers collectively also could improve their relative standing somewhat. And losing 37.1% in an S&P 500 fund instead of 37.2% in an actively managed large-cap blend fund shouldn't make anyone feel happy. But the average active manager's absolute and relative performance so far makes it hard, to paraphrase Vanguard founder and index fund creator Jack Bogle, for the active funds to claim superiority over the market averages.


But talk about disconnect !the same website contains an article about an "undiscovered" active manager with great returns and the curren issure of the affiliated magazine Morningstar Advisor contains an article entitled "Four Picks for the Present" three of the four funds are actively managed,

Sunday, March 15, 2009

I Think We Have Heard This Song Before...






from the LA Times


Getty slashes operating budget after severe investment losses
By Mike Boehm
Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
March 15, 2009

The J. Paul Getty Trust, envied as the economic Goliath of the museum world, is cutting its operating budget nearly 25 percent for the coming fiscal year -- an emergency response to investment losses that have totaled $1.5 billion since July and nearly $2 billion since mid-2007.

President James Wood said the financial stability of the Getty, the world's richest arts institution, could "fall off a huge cliff" if it delayed drastic cuts and hard times continue.

The Getty relies almost exclusively on investment earnings to cover expenses for its two Los Angeles art museums as well as the research, art-conservation and grant-making operations that extend the trust's reach around the world.

Its investment portfolio dropped 25 percent during the last half of 2008from $6 billion to $4.5 billion. ....


..... James Williams, the Getty's chief investment officer since 2002, said there was no plan to change the investment strategy the trust has pursued since the middle of this decade, betting heavily on "alternative investments" such as hedge funds, private partnerships, raw materials and "distressed" companies trying to emerge from Chapter 11 reorganization. Williams said the Getty's approach, which de-emphasizes holdings in publicly traded stocks and bonds, was safer because it allows greater investment diversity.

The strategy is known as the endowment model or the Yale model, in deference to the university that pioneered it in the 1980s, reaping huge returns and begetting many imitators among universities and other nonprofit institutions that can afford to invest huge sums over a long term. Williams said that over the past year and a half, the Getty has tried to minimize what he considers the approach's two pitfalls: investing in ventures that are loaded down with debt and tying up too much money in assets that are hard to sell quickly.


I will give them credit for the alight adjustment. But I still dont understand why it was so distateful for these institutions to do what I recommend to individuals keep funds needed in the next 3 years or more in very stable liquid assets like short term bond funds or tbills.

Friday, March 13, 2009

The Definitive Reason to Turn Off That Business Channel

Cramer vs Stewart mano a mano. Here's the full interview as posted on the Comedy Central Website including outakes not shown on the program :

stewart "we're both snake oil salesman to an extent"

cramer: "I don't disagree"....

stewart: "I know you want to make finance entertaining, but it's not a f#### game"....

Cramer: "There's a market for it (shows like "Fast Money")
Stewart: "There's a market for cocaine and prostitution too."






Monday, March 9, 2009

The NY Times on the Quants



Seems Everyone is "discovering" the role that the failure of academic financial modles had in the debacle in the financial markets. The NYT presents a nice overview.
and my favorite observer Nasem Taleeb is mentioned as on of the lone critics

Bere is an excerpt

Another consequence is that when you need financial models the most — on days like Black Monday in 1987 when the Dow dropped 20 percent — they might break down. The risks of relying on simple models are heightened by investors’ desire to increase their leverage by playing with borrowed money. In that case one bad bet can doom a hedge fund. Dr. Merton and Dr. Scholes won the Nobel in economic science in 1997 (pictured above) for the stock options model. Only a year later Long Term Capital Management, a highly leveraged hedge fund whose directors included the two Nobelists, collapsed and had to be bailed out to the tune of $3.65 billion by a group of banks.


Afterward a Merrill Lynch memorandum noted that the financial models “may provide a greater sense of security than warranted; therefore reliance on these models should be limited.”

That was a lesson apparently not learned.

Respect for Nerds

Given the state of the world, you might ask whether quants have any idea at all what they are doing.

Comparing quants to the scientists who had built the atomic bomb and therefore had a duty to warn the world of its dangers, a group of Wall Streeters and academics, led by Mike Brown, a former chairman of Nasdaq and chief financial officer of Microsoft, published a critique of modern finance on the Web site Edge.org last fall calling on scientists to reinvent economics.

Lee Smolin, a physicist at the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics in Waterloo, Ontario, who was one of the authors, said, “What is amazing to me as I learn about this is how flimsy was the theoretical basis of the claims that derivatives and other complex financial instruments reduced risk, when their use in fact brought on instabilities.”

But it is not so easy to get new ideas into the economic literature, many quants complain. J. Doyne Farmer, a physicist and professor at the Santa Fe Institute, and the founder and former chief scientist of the Prediction Company, said he was shocked when he started reading finance literature at how backward it was, comparing it to Middle-Ages theories of fire. “They were talking about phlogiston — not the right metaphor,” Dr. Farmer said.

One of the most outspoken critics is Nassim Nicholas Taleb, a former trader and now a professor at New York University. He got a rock-star reception at the World Economic Forum in Davos this winter. In his best-selling book “The Black Swan” (Random House, 2007), Dr. Taleb, who made a fortune trading currency on Black Monday, argues that finance and history are dominated by rare and unpredictable events.

“Every trader will tell you that every risk manager is a fraud,” he said, and options traders used to get along fine before Black-Scholes. “We never had any respect for nerds.”

Sunday, March 8, 2009

Efficient Market Theory Redux: Just Because It's Flawed Doesn't Mean You Can Pick A Manager That Will Beat The Market



From the Economist



THE GRAND ILLUSION
Mar 5th 2009


How efficient-market theory has been proved both wrong and right

THE past ten years have dealt a series of blows to efficient-market
theory, the idea that asset prices accurately reflect all available
information. In the late 1990s dotcom companies with no profits
and barely any earnings were valued in billions of dollars; and in 2006
investors massively underestimated the risks in bundling together
portfolios of American subprime mortgages.

There is now widespread acceptance that investors can behave
irrationally, creating very large anomalies. Take the momentum effect, the practice of buying the stockmarket's best performers over
the previous time period. A study by the London Business School found that,
since 1900, buying British stocks with the best momentum would have turned GBP1 into GBP1.95m (before costs and tax) by the end of last year; the same sum invested in the worst performers would have grown to just GBP31. In efficient markets, such an anomaly should be arbitraged away....

But it is important not to throw out all the insights of
efficient-market enthusiasts. Although it is theoretically possible to make money by outperforming the markets, it is extremely difficult in practice
.
That ought to have made investors suspicious of the
smoothness of the returns of Bernard Madoff, who has been accused of a vast fraud. His strategy, as advertised, might have produced less
volatile returns than the index, but the absence of negative months
suggested almost perfect market timing.


Some fund managers have beaten the markets over long periods. The problem is to identify them in advance. Picking them after
they have outperformed may be too late, as those who backed Legg Mason's Bill Miller have recently discovered
. Why is this? Fund managers are human too and subject to behavioural biases. In addition, the larger their funds become (as their reputation spreads), the more difficult it is to outperform

The temptation has also been to assume that fees are positively correlated with performance--that if mutual fund managers charging 1.5%
are good, hedge-fund managers charging 2% (and 20% of performance) are even better. Because investors cannot beat the market in aggregate, all this means is that money is transferred from investors to fund managers. Even David Swensen, the man who led the drive into alternative assets at Yale University, thinks most investors should rely on low-cost index-tracking funds

Saturday, March 7, 2009

Peter Lynch: I'm Confused




Peter Lynch, just after he retired from managing the Magellan Fund, as well as the legendary Warren Buffett, admitted that most investors would be better off in an index fund rather than investing in an actively managed equity mutual fund.
-- Burton Malkiel in A Random Walk Down Wall Street (p.144 in the 2007 edition)


Mr. Lynch said that even after this market decline, he would stick to the view that no one should hold stocks unless they could afford to lose an additional 50 percent. And he said he had not deviated from his faith in “bottom-down stock picking,” in which investors who have done their research buy shares of just five or six well-priced companies with strong balance sheets and “compelling stories.”


nyt march 7,2009